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Abstract
Best response (BR) dynamics is a natural method by which players proceed toward a
pure Nash equilibrium via a local search method. The quality of the equilibrium reached
may depend heavily on the order by which players are chosen to perform their best response
moves. A deviator rule S is a method for selecting the next deviating player. We provide
a measure for quantifying the performance of different deviator rules. The inefficiency of
a deviator rule S is the maximum ratio, over all initial profiles p, between the social cost
of the worst equilibrium reachable by S from p and the social cost of the best equilibrium
reachable from p. This inefficiency always lies between 1 and the price of anarchy.
We study the inefficiency of various deviator rules in network formation games and job
scheduling games (both are congestion games, where BR dynamics always converges to a pure
NE). For some classes of games, we compute optimal deviator rules. Furthermore, we define
and study a new class of deviator rules, called local deviator rules. Such rules choose the
next deviator as a function of a restricted set of parameters, and satisfy a natural condition
called independence of irrelevant players. We present upper bounds on the inefficiency of
some local deviator rules, and also show that for some classes of games, no local deviator
rule can guarantee inefficiency lower than the price of anarchy.
1 Introduction
Nash equilibrium (NE) is perhaps the most popular solution concept in games. It is a strategy
profile from which no individual player can benefit by a unilateral deviation. However, a Nash
equilibrium is a declarative notion, not an algorithmic one. To justify equilibrium analysis, we
have to come up with a natural behavior model that leads the players of a game to a Nash
equilibrium. Otherwise, the prediction that players play an equilibrium is highly questionable.
Best response dynamics is a simple and natural method by which players proceed toward a NE
via the following local search method: as long as the strategy profile is not a NE, an arbitrary
player is chosen to improve her utility by deviating to her best strategy given the profile of
others.
Work on BR dynamics advanced in two main avenues: The first studies whether BR dynamics
converges to a NE, if one exists, e.g., [33, 26] and references therein. The second explores how
fast it takes until BR dynamics converges to a NE, e.g., [17, 19, 36, 28].
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It is well known that BR dynamics does not always converge to a NE, even if one exists.
However, for the class of finite potential games [35, 32], a pure NE always exists, and BR
dynamics is guaranteed to converge to one of the equilibria of the game. A potential game is
one that admits a potential function — a function that assigns a real value to every strategy
profile, and has the miraculous property that for any unilateral deviation, the change in the
utility of the deviating player is mirrored accurately in the potential function. The proof follows
in a straight forward way from the definition of a potential game. Due to the mirroring effect,
and since the game is finite, the process of BR updates must terminate, and this happens at
some local minimum of the potential function, which is a NE by definition. While BR dynamics
is guaranteed to converge, convergence may take an exponential number of iterations, even in
a potential game. [2] showed that a network design game with costs obtained by a sum of
construction cost and latency cost, which is a potential game, convergence via best response
dynamics can be exponentially long.
Our focus in this work is different than the directions mentioned above. The description
of BR dynamics leaves the choice of the deviating player unspecified. Thus, BR dynamics is
essentially a large family of dynamics, differing from one another in the choice of who would be
the next player to perform her best response move. In this paper, we study how the choice of
the deviating player (henceforth a deviator rule) affects the efficiency of the equilibrium reached
via BR dynamics.
Our contribution is three fold.
First, we introduce a new measure for quantifying the performance of different deviator
rules. This measure can be used to quantify the performance of different deviator rules in
various settings, beyond the ones considered in this paper.
Second, we introduce a natural class of simple deviator rules, we refer to as local. Local
deviator rules are simpler to apply, since they are based on limited information. In practice,
simple deviator rules should be preferred over more complicated ones. Our results help in
quantifying the efficiency loss incurred due to simplicity.
Finally, we quantify the inefficiency of various deviator rules in two paradigmatic congestion
games, namely network formation games and job scheduling games. Our results distinguish
between games where local deviator rules can lead to good outcomes and games for which any
local deviator rule performs poorly.
1.1 Model and Problem Statement
A game G has a set N of n players. Each player i has a strategy space Pi, from which she chooses
a strategy pi ∈ Pi. A strategy profile is a vector of strategies for each player, p = (p1, . . . , pn).
The strategy profile of all players except player i is denoted by p−i, and it is convenient to denote
a strategy profile p as p = (pi, p−i). Each player has a cost function ci : P → R≥0, where ci(p)
denotes player i’s cost in the strategy profile p. Every player wishes to minimize her cost. There
is also a social objective function, mapping each strategy profile to a social cost.
Given a strategy profile p, the best response of player i is BRi(p) = arg minp′i∈Pi ci(p
′
i, p−i);
i.e., the set of strategies that minimize player i’s cost, fixing the strategies of all other players.
Player i is said to be suboptimal in p if the player can reduce her cost by a unilateral deviation,
i.e., if pi 6∈ BRi(p). If no player is suboptimal in p, then p is a Nash equilibrium (NE) (in this
paper we restrict attention to pure NE; i.e., an equilibrium in pure strategies).
Given an initial strategy profile p0, a best response sequence from p0 is a sequence 〈p0, p1, . . .〉
2
in which for every T = 0, 1, . . . there exists a player i ∈ N such that pT+1 = (p′i, pT−i), where
p′i ∈ BRi(pT−i). In this paper we restrict attention to games in which every BR sequence is
guaranteed to converge to a NE.
Deviator rules and their inefficiency. A deviator rule is a function S : P → N that
given a profile p, chooses a deviator among all suboptimal players in p. The chosen player then
performs a best response move (breaking ties arbitrarily). Given an initial strategy profile p0
and a deviator rule S we denote by NES(p
0) the set of NE that can be obtained as the final
profile of a BR sequence 〈p0, p1, . . .〉, where for every T ≥ 0, pT+1 is a profile resulting from a
deviation of S(pT ) (recall that players break ties arbitrarily, thus this is a set of possible Nash
equilibria).
Given an initial profile p0, let NE(p0) be the set of Nash equilibria reachable from p0 via
a BR sequence, and let p?(p0) be the best NE reachable from p0 via a BR sequence, that is,
p?(p0) = arg minp∈NE(p0) SC(p), where SC : P → R is some social cost function.
The inefficiency of a deviator rule S in a game G, denoted αGS , is defined as the worst ratio,
among all initial profiles p0, and all NE in NES(p
0), between the social cost of the worst NE
reachable by S (from p0) and the social cost of the best NE reachable from p0. I.e.,
αGS = sup
p0
max
p∈NES(p0)
SC(p)
SC(p?(p0))
.
For a class of games G, the inefficiency of a deviator rule S with respect to G is defined as the
worst case inefficiency over all games in G: αGS = supG∈G{αGS }. A deviator rule with inefficiency
1 is said to be optimal, i.e., an optimal deviator rule is one that for every initial profile reaches
a best equilibrium reachable from that initial profile.
The following observation, shows that the inefficiency of every deviator rule is bounded from
above by the price of anarchy (PoA) [31, 34]. Recall that the PoA is the ratio between the cost
of the worst NE and the cost of the social optimum, and is used to quantify the loss incurred
due to selfish behavior.
Observation 1.1 For every game G and for every deviator rule S it holds that the inefficiency
of S is at least 1 and bounded from above by the PoA.
Proof: For every game G, initial profile p0, and deviator rule S, by definition, p?(p0) =
arg minp∈NE(p0) SC(p). Since NES(p0) ⊆ NE(p0) we know that SC(p?(p0)) ≤ SC(NEs(p0))
and therefore SC(NES(p
0))
SC(p?(p0))
≥ 1. Also, SC(NES(p0))
SC(p?(p0))
≤ SC(NES(p0))minp∈P SC(p) ≤
maxp∈P SC(p)
minp∈P SC(p)
= PoA(G).
Since 1 ≤ SC(NES(p0))
SC(p?(p0))
≤ PoA(G), we conclude 1 ≤ supp0 SC(NES(p
0))
SC(p?(p0))
≤ PoA(G) and therefore
1 ≤ αGS ≤ PoA(G).
Local deviator rules. We define and study a class of simple deviator rules, called local
deviator rules. Local deviator rules are defined with respect to state vectors, that represent
the state of the players in a particular strategy profile. Given a profile p, every player i is
associated with a state vector vi, consisting of several parameters that describe her state in p
and in the strategy profile obtained by her best response. The specific parameters may vary
from one application to another. A vector profile is a vector v = (v1, . . . , vn), consisting of the
state vectors of all players. A deviator rule is said to be local if it satisfies the independence of
irrelevant players condition, defined below.
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Definition 1.1 A deviator rule S satisfies independence of irrelevant players (IIP) if for every
two state vectors vi1 , vi2, and every two vector profiles v, v
′ such that v = (vi1 , vi2 , v−i1,i2), and
v′ = (vi1 , vi2 , v′−i1,i2)
1, if S(v) = i1, then S(v
′) 6= i2.
The IIP condition means that if the deviator rule chooses a state vector vi over a state
vector vj in one profile, then, whenever these two state vectors exist, the deviator rule would
not choose vector vj over vi. Note that this condition should hold even across different game
instances and even when the number of players is different. Many natural deviator rules satisfy
the IIP condition. For example, suppose that the state vector of a player contains her cost
in the current profile and her cost in the profile obtained by her best response; then, both (i)
max-cost, which chooses the player with the maximum current cost, and (ii) max-improvement,
which chooses the player with the maximum improvement, are local deviator rules.
Congestion games. A congestion game has a set E of m resources, and the strategy space
of every player i is a collection of sets of resources; i.e., Pi ⊆ 2E . Every resource e ∈ E has a
cost function fe : IN→ IR, where fe(`) is the cost of resource e if ` players use resource e. The
cost of player i in a strategy profile p is ci(p) =
∑
e∈pi fe(`e(p)), where `e(p) is the number of
players that use resource e in the profile p. Every congestion game is a potential game [32], thus
admits a pure NE, and moreover, every BR sequence converges to a pure NE. In this paper we
study the efficiency of deviator rules in the following congestion games:
Network formation games [2]: There is an underlying graph, and every player is associated
with a pair of source and target nodes si, ti. The strategy space of every player i is the set of
paths from si to ti. The resources are the edges of the graph, every edge e is associated with
some fixed cost ce, which is evenly distributed by the players using it. That is, the cost of an
edge e in a profile p is fe(p) = ce/`(p). In network formation games the cost of a resource
decreases in the number of players using it. We also consider a weighted version of network
formation games on parallel edge networks, where players have weights and the cost of an edge
is shared proportionally by its users. The social cost function here is the sum of the players’
costs; that is SC(p) =
∑
i∈N ci(p).
The state vector of a player in a network formation game, in a profile p, consists of:
1. Player i’s cost in p: ci(p)
2. The cost of player i’s path:
∑
e∈pi ce
3. Player i’s cost in the profile obtained from a best response of i: ci(p
′(i)) (where p′(i) =
(p−i, BRi(p−i)) is the profile obtained from a best response of i).
4. The cost of player i’s path in the profile p′(i):
∑
e∈BRi(p−i) ce.
In weighted instances, the state vector includes player i’s weight as well.
Job scheduling games [38]: The resources are machines, and players are jobs that need to be
processed on one of the machines. Each job has some length, and the strategy space of every
player is the set of the machines. The load on a machine in a strategy profile p is the total length
of the jobs assigned to it. The cost of a job is the load on its chosen machine. We also consider
games with conflicting congestion effect ([23, 10]), where jobs have unit length and in addition
to the cost associated with the load, every machine has an activation cost B, shared by the jobs
1Note that the profiles v and v′ may correspond to different sets of players.
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assigned to it. The social cost function here is the makespan, that is SC(p) = maxi∈N ci(p).
The state vector of a job (player) in a job scheduling game, in a profile p, consists of the job’s
length, its current machine, and the loads on the machines.
1.2 Our Results
In Section 2 we present our results for network formation games. Some of our results refer to
restricted graph topologies. These topologies are defined in Appendix A. We first show that
in general network formation games, finding a BRD-sequence that approximates the optimum
better than the PoA is NP-hard. Therefore, we restrict attention to subclasses: We study
symmetric games, where all the players share the same source and target nodes. We show that
the local Min-Path deviator rule, which chooses a player with the cheapest best response path,
is optimal. In contrast, the local Max-Cost deviator rule has the worst possible inefficiency,
n (which matches the PoA for this game). We then consider asymmetric network formation
games. Unfortunately, the optimality of Min-Path does not carry over to asymmetric network
formation games, even when played on series of parallel paths (SPP) networks. In particular,
the inefficiency of Min-Path in single-source multi-targets instances is θ(|V |), and for multi-
sources multi-targets instances, it further grows to θ(2|V |). On the positive side, we show a
poly(n, |V |) dynamic-programming algorithm for finding an optimal BR sequence for network
formation games played on SPP networks in single-source multi-targets instances. We also
show a poly(n, |V |) such algorithm for multi-sources multi-targets instances that admit “proper
intervals” (see Section 2.3.2 for formal definitions). For network formation games played on
extension-parallel networks we show that every local deviator rule has an inefficiency of Ω(n).
In Section 2.5 we study network formation games with weighted players. It turns out that
weighted players lead to quite negative results. We show that even in the simplest case of
parallel-edge networks, it is NP-hard to find an optimal BR-sequence, and no local deviator rule
can ensure a constant inefficiency. Moreover, the Min-Path deviator rule has inefficiency Ω(n),
even in symmetric games on SPP networks, and even if the ratio between the maximal and
minimal weights approaches 1. This result is quite surprising in light of the fact that Min-Path
is optimal (i.e., has inefficiency 1) for any symmetric network formation game with unweighted
players.
Job scheduling games with m identical machines are studied in Section 3. A job’s (= player’s)
state vector in job scheduling games includes the job’s length, its machine, and the machines’
loads. Thus, local deviator rules capture many natural rules, such as Longest-Job, Max-Cost,
Max-Improvement, and more. We show that no local deviator rule can guarantee inefficiency
better than the PoA in this class of games (which is 2mm+1). In contrast, for job scheduling games
with conflicting congestion effects [23] we present an optimal local deviator rule.
Positive results on local deviator rules imply that a centralized authority that can control
the order of deviations can lead the population to a good outcome, by considering merely local
information captured in the close neighborhood of the current state. In contrast, negative
results for local deviator rules imply that even if a centralized authority can control the order
of deviations, in order to converge to a good outcome, it cannot rely only on local information;
rather, it must be able to perform complex calculations and to consider a large search space.
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1.3 Related work
A lot of research has been conducted on the analysis of congestion games using a game-theoretic
approach. The questions that are commonly analyzed are Nash equilibrium existence, the con-
vergence of BR dynamics to a NE, and the loss incurred due to selfish behavior – commonly
quantified according to the price of anarchy [31, 34] and price of stability (PoS) [2] measures.
Our work addresses mainly congestion games. Specifically, we consider network formation
games and job scheduling games and variants thereof. It is well known that every congestion
game is a potential game [35, 32] and therefore admits a PNE. In potential games every BR
dynamics converges to a PNE. However, the convergence time may, in general, be exponentially
long. It has been shown in [14] that in random potential games with n players in which every
player has at most a strategies, the worst case convergence time is n · an−1. The average
case convergence time in random potential games is sublinear but along with the computation
complexity of finding the best response has running time of O(a · n). Results regarding the
convergence time in network formation games are shown in [2], [19]. They showed that in
general, finding a PNE is PLS-complete. In the restricted case of symmetric players, in a game
with both positive and negative congestion effects, the convergence is polynomial. Analysis of
job scheduling games is presented in [16], where it is shown that it may take exponential number
of steps to converge in general cases.
The observation that convergence via best response dynamics can be exponentially long has
led to a large amount of work aiming to identify special classes of congestion games, where BRD
converges to a Nash equilibrium in polynomial time or even linear time, as shown by [2] for
games with positive congestion effects and by
[16] for games with negative congestion effects. This agenda has been the focus of [25] that
considered symmetric network formation games with negative congestion effect played on an
extension-parallel graph, and showed that the convergence is bounded by n steps. For resource
selection games (i.e., where feasible strategies are composed of singletons), it has been shown in
[28] that better-response dynamics converges within at most mn2 steps for general cost functions
(where m is the number of resources).
Another direction of research considers an approximate Nash equilibrium, also known as -
Nash equilibrium. An approximate-NE is a strategy profile in which no player can significantly
improve her utility by a unilateral deviation. [9] presented an algorithm that identifies a poly-
nomially long sequence of BR moves that leads to an approximate NE in congestion games
with linear latency functions. [8] showed for the more general case of polynomially decreasing
resources’ cost functions, given an algorithm to find -best response, convergence time is poly-
nomial. In weighted network formation games which are known to not always have a PNE, [12]
study the relations between the  needed to ensure existence of an -PNE and the inefficiency
of the solution. [11] showed that it takes poly(n, 1 ) steps to converge to a PNE in symmet-
ric network formation games, and that even when using different thresholds i the amount of
deviations conducted by player i will be poly(n, 1i ).
Another technique for controlling the convergence time of BRD is using a specific deviator
rule. [16] compared the convergence time of different deviator rules for different variants of
job scheduling games. For example, for instances of identical machines they show that the
Max-Weight-Job deviator rule ensures convergence in at most n steps while convergence by the
Min-Weight-Job can be exponential. They also show that the FIFO deviator rule converges
within time O(n2) and the expected convergence time of a random order is also O(n2). [23] and
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[10] considered a variant of job scheduling with both negative and positive congestion effects and
analyzed their PoA and PoS. We will refer to that model in this work. [22] showed that using
the Max-Cost deviator rule, tightly bounds the convergence rate to 1.5n (worst-case) in these
games. The Max-Cost deviator rule was also considered in [30] for Swap-Games [4]. In Swap-
Games with initial strategies corresponding to a tree it has been shown that the convergence
time is O(n3), but using the Max-Cost deviator rule improves the bound to O(n).
Although every congestion game have a PNE and BRD always converges to one, examples
for variants of congestion games that do not have a PNE or that BRD does not necessarily
converge to one are shown in the literature. In particular, [12] presents a network-formation
game with weighted players that does not have a PNE;
[26] presents a characterization of the resources’ cost functions that ensures existence of PNE,
and proves various conditions for the finite-improvement-property (FIP) that implies that every
best response dynamic converges to a PNE. [33] shows that in a variant of congestion games in
which every player has a specific decreasing cost function for every resource, the FIP condition
does not necessarily hold. Though there is always a PNE and best response dynamics can
always converges to it, it is shown that there can be infinitely long best response sequences and
conditions for them to occur are presented. [5] presents network formation games with a variation
that players do not aim to connect a source and a sink, but to select a path corresponding to a
word in a regular language, assuming the edges are labeled by an alphabet. They showed cases
with no PNE and moreover, that computing a player’s best response is NP-hard, as was shown
for another variant of network formation games presented in [18]. A variant of job scheduling
game on unrelated parallel machines, studied in [6] is shown to have a PNE only for unit-cost
machines. All the above works imply that the existence of a PNE, as well as the convergence
of BRD to one are not trivial. Moreover, even when a PNE exists and BRD is guaranteed to
converge, the implementation of best response dynamics can be computationally hard.
BRD has been studied also in games that do not converge to a PNE. The notion of dynamic
inefficiency was defined in [7] as the average of social costs in a best response infinite sequence
(for games that do not possess the finite improvement property). They considered the effect of
the chosen player on the obtained efficiency in games where BR dynamics can cycle indefinitely.
They consider job scheduling games, hotelling model and facility location games and study the
dynamic inefficiency of Random Walk, Round Robin and Best Improvement deviator rules.
2 Network Formation Games
In this section we study network formation games. We consider two natural local deviator
rules, namely Max-Cost and Min-Path. The Max-Cost deviator rule chooses a suboptimal
player that incurs the highest cost in the current strategy profile p, i.e., Max − Cost(p) ∈
arg max{i∈N |pi 6∈BRi(p)} ci(p). The Min-Path deviator rule chooses a suboptimal player whose
path in the profile obtained from a best response move is cheapest, i.e., Min − Path(p) ∈
arg min{i∈N |pi 6∈BRi(p)}
∑
e∈BRi(p) ce. Both rules are local deviator rules.
Recall that some of our results refer to restricted graph topologies, defined in Appendix A.
This section is organized as follows. Section 2.2 includes our analysis of symmetric games. In
Sections 2.3 and 2.4 we study games played on series of parallel paths networks and extension
parallel networks, respectively. Finally, in Section 2.5 we study weighted network formation
games.
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2.1 The BRD-Inefficiency in General Network Formation Games
We start with the most general form of network formation games, with no restriction on the
network topology or the players’ objectives. We prove that for the general case it is NP-hard to
find a deviator rule whose inefficiency is lower than the PoA.
Theorem 2.1 In network formation games, it is NP-hard to find a deviator rule with ineffi-
ciency lower than Ω(n).
Proof: Given a game, an initial strategy profile, and a value k, the associated decision
problem is whether there exists an order according to which the players are activated and
results in a NE whose social cost is at most k. We show a reduction from the Partition problem:
Given a set of numbers {a1, a2, ..., an} such that
∑
i∈[n] ai = 2, the goal is to find a subset
I ⊆ [n] such that ∑i∈I ai = ∑i∈[n]\I ai = 1. This problem is NP-hard even if it is known that
such a subset I exists. Given an instance of Partition, such that for some I ⊆ [n], it holds that∑
i∈I ai = 1, consider the network depicted in Figure 1, with the following initial strategy profile
of 2n+ 2 = O(n) players:
• Players 1, . . . , n: Each Player i ∈ [n], has a source vi−1 and a target vi and she initially
uses the upper edge of cost 3 by herself. The alternative edge for Player i costs ai.
• Players n + 1, . . . , 2n: n players whose objective is an 〈s′, t′〉-path. Initially, they all use
the lower (s′, t′)-edge of cost n, thus, each of them pays 1.
• Player a whose objective is an 〈sa, ta,b〉-path. She initially uses the upper path and share
its second edge with Player b, so her initial cost is 1.5 + 2 .
• Player b whose objective is an 〈sb, ta,b〉-path. She initially uses the upper path and share
its second edge with Player a, so her initial cost is 1.5 + 2 .
𝑣1 𝑣2 𝑣𝑛−1 𝑣𝑛 … 𝑡𝑎,𝑏 
3, (𝟏) 3, (𝟏) 3, (𝟏) 3, (𝟏) 
𝑎1 𝑎2 𝑎𝑖 𝑎𝑛 
𝑠𝑏 𝑠𝑎 𝑣0 
0 0 
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6
 
𝑡′ 𝑠′ 
0 
0 
0 
2 − 𝜖 0 
𝑛, (𝒏) 
Figure 1: The network constructed for a given Partition instance. Every edge is labeled by its
cost and (in brackets) the number of players using it in the initial strategy profile.
The following simple observations limit the possible BRD sequences of the above game
instance:
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1. Since ai < 3, for all i ∈ [n], each of the first n players uses the ai-edge in any NE.
2. The n 〈s′, t′〉-players would benefit from a deviation only after the edge of cost 2 −  is
utilized by some other player.
3. Players a and b will never use edges of cost 3. If they select a path that passes through
v0, it will consist of all the ai-edges. The initial cost of this alternative path for Player a
is
∑
ai = 2. She will deviate to this path only after her total share in the ai-edges is at
most 1.5.
4. As long as Player a is using the upper path, deviating to a path through v0 is not beneficial
for Player b, since such a path will incur her a cost of at least 76 + 1. Also, deviating to the
lower path will incur her a cost of 2 − , which is more than her current cost. Therefore,
Player b will not deviate before Player a.
Using the above observations we prove the statement of the reduction.
Claim 2.2 Let I be a subset of [n] such that
∑
i∈I ai = 1. A deviator rule that knows I can
determine a BR-sequence that ends up with a NE whose social cost is O(1). If I is not detected
then the final NE will have social cost Ω(n).
Proof: Assume that a subset I ⊆ [n] such that ∑i∈I ai = 1 is known. Consider a BR-
sequence in which the players in I deviate first (in an arbitrary order), then Player a deviates,
then Player b, and then all the suboptimal players (in an arbitrary order). Since
∑
i∈I ai = 1,
the players in I utilize ai-edges of total cost 1. When Player a gets to deviate, she selects a
path that passes through v0. Her share in the sub-path consisting of the ai-edges is 0.5 for the
utilized edges, and 1 for the non-utilized edges. Since her current cost is 1.5 + 2 , this deviation
is indeed beneficial.
When Player b gets to deviate, her share in the sub-path consisting of the ai-edges would be
1
3 +
1
2 =
5
6 . Her best response is therefore the lower path since 2−  < 76 + 56 = 2.
After Player b deviates all the players using the expensive (s′, t′)-edge will join Player b, and
the rest of the first n players will deviate to their corresponding ai-edge. The social cost of the
resulting NE would be 2− + 76 + 2 = 556 −  = O(1).
For the other direction of the reduction assume that the social cost of some NE reachable
from the given initial profile is a constant. We show that the deviator rule must activate a
subset of the players 1, . . . , n, corresponding to partition elements of total size 1 before Player
a deviates. In order to end up with a constant social cost, the expensive lower (s′, t′)-edge was
abandoned. By the above observations, the players using this edge deviated to the (2− )-edge,
and in order for that to happen, Player b must deviate to this (2 − )-edge first. As stated,
Player b will not deviate before Player a. Also, players 1, . . . , n must deviate sometime along
the dynamics. Let xa (xb) be the total cost of ai-edges utilized by Players 1, 2, . . . , n before
Player a (b) deviated. Since Player a must deviate before Player b it holds that xa ≤ xb.
In order for the deviation to be profitable for Player a, it must be that 12 ·xa+(2−xa) < 1.5+ 2 ,
since her newly incurred cost consists of her share in the cost of edges she share with players
that already deviated and the cost of edges she uses alone. We conclude that xa > 1− .
In order for Player b to deviate to the (2− )-edge it must be more beneficial than deviating
to a path through v0. The latter would consists of the edge of cost
7
6 , edges she share with
9
Player a and players in [n] that already deviated, and edges that she share only with Player a.
Formally, 2−  ≤ 76 + 13 · xb + 12 · (2− xb). That is, xb ≤ 1 + 6.
Combining the above observations, we get that 1−  < xa ≤ xb ≤ 1 + 6. This implies that
for  < 16 mini ai, we have xa = xb = 1. The set of players that utilize the edges of total cost 1
correspond to a set I ⊂ [n] of sum 1, which induces a partition.
Finally, note that any other BR-sequence leaves the lower expensive edge activated, and
therefore, has total cost Ω(n).
2.2 Symmetric Network Formation Games
A network-formation game is symmetric if all the players have the same source and target nodes.
Recall that the inefficiency of any deviator rule is upper bounded by the price of anarchy of the
game. It is well known that the PoA of network formation games is n (i.e., the number of
players).
We first show that the Max-Cost rule may perform as poorly as the PoA, even in symmetric
games on parallel-edge networks.
Observation 2.3 The inefficiency of Max-Cost in symmetric network formation games on
parallel-edge networks is n.
Proof: Given n ∈ N, we present an instance G over n players for which αGMax−Cost = n.
Consider the network depicted in Figure 2. The initial profile consists of a single player using
1, 𝑎𝑖 𝑖=1
𝑛  
 
 
 
 
1, 𝑎𝑖 𝑖=1
𝑛  
 
 
 
 
s t 
1 − 𝜖, {2𝐵} 1 + 𝜖, {2𝐵} 
1, 𝑎𝑖 𝑖∈ 𝑛 ∖𝐼 
 
 
 
 
1, 𝑎𝑖 𝑖∈ 𝑛 ∖𝐼 
 
 
 
 
s t 
1 + 𝜖, {2𝐵} ∪ 𝑎𝑖 𝑖∈𝐼 1 − 𝜖, {2𝐵} ∪ 𝑎𝑖 𝑖∈𝐼 
(𝑎) (𝑏) 
1 
s t 
1 − 𝜖 
1/𝑛 
Figure 2: A network on which Max-Cost has inefficiency n.
the top edge and n− 1 players using the bottom edge. For the first step, the cost of the player
on the top edge is 1 and the costs of the players on the bottom one is 1−n−1 . Therefore, Max-Cost
chooses the player on the upper edge. That player migrates to the bottom edge, resulting in
social cost 1− . However, if the players on the bottom edge deviate first (to the middle edge),
then the player on the top edge will also deviate to the middle edge, resulting in a NE profile
with a social cost of 1n . The ratio converges to n as → 0.
On the other hand, we show that Min-Path is an optimal deviator rule, i.e., it always reaches
the best NE reachable from any initial profile. Our analysis of Min-Path is based on the following
Lemma:
Lemma 2.4 In symmetric network formation games, the path chosen by the first deviator is
the unique path that will be chosen by all subsequent players, regardless of the order in which
they deviate.
Proof: Assume that player i1 is the first to migrate and it chooses p1 as a best response.
Since p1 is i1’s best-response, after her deviation she cannot be suboptimal, and so are all the
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other players who use p1 by symmetry. Assume, by a way of contradiction, that p2 6= p1 is a
best response of a suboptimal player i2 not using p1. Since i2 can deviate to p1 and incur a cost
lower than the cost i1 pays, but prefers to deviate to p2 - a deviation of i1 to p2 will also be
beneficial, a contradiction.
Lemma 2.4 directly implies the optimality of Min-Path:
Theorem 2.5 Min-Path is an optimal deviator rule for symmetric network formation games.
Proof: By lemma 2.4 after the first deviation, the first deviation dictates the NE to be
reached. Thus, the set of BR paths in p0 are the set of reachable NE, and choosing the cheapest
one among them is optimal.
2.3 Series of Parallel Paths (SPP) Networks
In this section we study network formation games played on SPP networks. An SPP network
consists of m segments, where each segment is a parallel-edge network. Let {u0, . . . , um} denote
the vertex set, and for every j ≤ m, let Ej denote the set of edges in segment j (i.e., the parallel
edges connecting uj−1 and uj). For a player i, let E(i) = ∪si<k≤tiEk, denote the set of edges
player i may choose.
Note that in an SPP network, a player’s choice of an edge in Ej is independent of any other
segment in her path. This implies that a network formation game on an SPP network consists
of a sequence of symmetric games, where the set of players participating in each game varies.
Combining this observation with Lemma 2.4 implies the following.
Lemma 2.6 In every network formation game played on an SPP network with m segments,
for every 1 ≤ j ≤ m, and every BR sequence, let i be the first player in the sequence such that
Ej ∈ E(i), and let e be the edge in Ej chosen by player i. Then e is the unique edge in Ej
players deviate to.
2.3.1 Optimal BR sequence for single-source, multi-targets games
We first consider single-source, multi-targets instances. For this case, we devise a dynamic
programming algorithm that computes an optimal BR sequence.
Theorem 2.7 For any single-source multi-targets network formation game played on an SPP
network, an optimal BR sequence can be computed in time O(nm), where m is the number of
segments and n is the number of players.
Proof: Lemma 2.6 applied to a game with a single source implies that a migration of a player
i with target uj determines the path from the source (s = u0) to uj that will be used in the NE
reached.
Let Nj denote the subnetwork consisting of the last j segments in the input SPP. Formally,
Nj = ∪mk=m−j+1Ek. Our dynamic programming solution is based on calculating an optimal
solution for every suffix Nj of the network. In particular, a solution for Nm is a solution for the
input SPP.
Let OPTj be the minimum cost of a path that can be reached in the game induced by Nj ,
and let Pj denote the first player that has to migrate in order to reach it. The base case of
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the dynamic programming is j = 1. Clearly, OPT1 and P1 can be easily found since the game
induced by N1 is symmetric:
OPT1 = min{i|ti=um}
c(BRi(p
0) ∩N1)
P1 = arg min
{i|ti=um}
c(BRi(p
0) ∩N1).
For j = 2, . . . ,m we calculate OPTj and Pj as follows: For every player i such that ti ∈
{um−j+1, . . . um}, denote by OPT ij the minimal cost of a path that can be reached in the game
induced by Nj , if player i is the first to perform her BR. Assume ti = uk. By Lemma 2.6, the
NE corresponding to OPT ij consists of a prefix em−j , . . . , ek in Em−j+1∪ ...∪Ek, which is player
i’s best response path. That prefix is followed by a suffix of cost OPTm−k. Denote the prefix’s
cost by Cim−j,ti = c(BRi(p
0) ∩Nj)
We can compute OPTj , Pj using the following formulas:
OPT ij = C
i
m−j,ti +OPTm−k , ti = uk
OPTj = min{i|ti∈{um−j ,...um}}
OPT ij
Pj = arg min
{i|ti∈{um−j ,...um}}
OPT ij
The algorithm consists of an O(nm) preprocessing in which the values Cim−j,ti are calculated
for all j and i. Given C, it is possible to calculate each of OPT2, . . . , OPTm in time O(n), giving
a total of O(nm) for the whole algorithm. Note that the player Pj is a one determining OPTj ,
that is, OPTj = OPT
Pj
j . Given OPTj , Pj for all j, the BR sequence begins with Pm as the first
player, if its target is uk then the next player to perform BR will be Pk, etc.
2.3.2 Optimal BR sequence for multi-sources, multi-targets games with proper
intervals
In this section we consider multi-sources, multi-targets instances with proper intervals. A net-
work formation game played on an SPP network is said to have proper intervals if for every two
players i1, i2 it holds that if si1 < si2 then ti1 ≤ ti2 . We denote by [si, ti] the set of segments from
i’s source to i’s target, and call it the interval of player i. I.e., [si, ti] = Esi+1 ∪Esi+2 ∪ ...∪Eti .
Theorem 2.8 For any multi-sources multi-targets network formation game played on an SPP
network with proper intervals, an optimal BR sequence can be computed in time O(nm2), where
m is the number of segments and n is the number of players.
As in the single-source case in the previous subsection, every deviation dictates the specific path
that will be used in the NE reached. Therefore, the best NE path reached by a BR sequence
that starts by a deviation of a specific player, consists of the player’s BR path and the best
solution in the subnetworks that the player doesn’t use. Our dynamic programming solution
uses this observation to find the player that the NE reached by a BR sequence that starts with
her deviation is the optimal. To find that NE, we consider the player’s BR path and the optimal
paths on the residual, strictly shorter subnetworks. Denote by Ns,t the subnetwork consisting
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of the segments connecting us and ut. That is, Ns,t = ∪tk=s+1Ek. The dynamic programming
solution is based on calculating, for every 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ m, an optimal solution for the subnetwork
Ns,t by iterating over the subnetworks in ascending lengths. In particular, a solution for N0,m
is a solution for the input SPP. Let OPTs,t be the minimum social cost in a NE that can be
reached in the game induced by Ns,t. Let Ps,t denote the first player that has to migrate in order
to reach that optimal NE. The base cases of the dynamic programming are all the subnetworks
induced by a single segment, i.e., Nj−1,j for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m. Clearly, OPTj−1,j and Pj−1,j can be
easily found since the game induced by Nj−1,j is symmetric. So we initialize
OPTj−1,j = min{i|Ej∈[si,ti]}
c(BRi(p
0) ∩Nj−1,j)
Pj−1,j = arg min
{i|Ej∈[si,ti]}
c(BRi(p
0) ∩Nj−1,j)
In addition, for all 0 ≤ j ≤ m, we initialize OPTj,j = 0.
For t > s + 1, we compute OPTs,t and Ps,t as follows: For every player i for which [s, t] ∩
[si, ti] 6= ∅, denote by OPT is,t the minimal cost of a path that can be reached in the game
induced by Ns,t, if player i is the first to perform her BR. Denote by C
i
s,t the cost of i’s BR on
the subnetwork Ns,t ∩ [si, ti].
Cis,t = c(BRi(p
0) ∩Ns,t)
When calculating OPT is,t We distinguish between four cases:
• If Ns,t ⊂ [si, ti] then OPT is,t = Cis,t, i.e., if the subnetwork is contained in the i’s interval
then its deviation will set the cost of the whole subnetwork.
• If Es+1 ∈ [si, ti] then OPT is,t = Cis,ti + OPTti,t, i.e., if the subnetwork has a suffix not
contained in i’s interval then its deviation will set the cost of their intersection and we
need to add the optimal cost of the suffix to the total cost.
• If Et ∈ [si, ti] then OPT is,t = OPTs,si + Cisi,t, residue prefix equivalent to the suffix in the
previous condition
• Otherwise, OPT is,t = OPTs,si + Cisi,ti + OPTti,t, combines residue prefix and suffix of
the subnetwork over the player’s interval. Note that since we assume a proper interval
instance, no player that plays in Ns,si can play in Nti,t and vice versa, so the process of
computing each of them is completely independent.
In each of the cases, the calculation of OPT is,t requires as sub-problems only values of OPTs′,t′
for which Ns′,t′ is strictly shorter than Ns,t. Also, our base cases include Nj,j and Nj−1,j for
every j, thus calculating OPT is,t can be done by iterating through Ns,t in increasing length. We
get that
OPTs,t = min{i|[s,t]∩[si,ti]6=∅}
OPT is,t,
Ps,t = arg min
{i|[s,t]∩[si,ti]6=∅}
OPT is,t
The algorithm consists of an O(n · m2)-time preprocessing in which the values Cis,t are
calculated for all i, s and t. Given C, it is possible to calculate each of OPTs,t in time O(n ·m2),
giving a total of O(n ·m2) for the whole algorithm. The set of players Ps,t that are calculated
in the process form the optimal BR-sequence.
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2.3.3 The performance of Min-Path in SPP networks
After presenting non-local optimal deviator rules, we turn to analyze the inefficiency of Min-
Path that was shown to be optimal for symmetric network formation games. Given an SPP
network and a BR-sequence, we say that a segment is unresolved if there are at least two players
whose interval include the segment, and each of them will select a different edge in the segment
if chosen to perform a BR next. The other segments are denoted resolved. By Lemma 2.6, after
a player performs her best response, all the segments in her interval are resolved. Thus, no
player migrates more than once. By definition, in a resolved segment, the edge chosen in every
reachable Nash equilibria is determined already, therefore, migrations of players who use only
resolved segments do not influence the reachable Nash equilibria and in the following analyses
we ignore them. In other words, all the deviations we consider resolve at least one segment. We
denote by Ri the resolved segments after i such deviations. Let OPT denote the minimal cost
of a NE reachable from p0 by some BR sequence. Formally, OPT = SC(p?(p0)).
Lemma 2.9 For any BR sequence of an SPP network instance, as long as there are unresolved
segments, there exists a suboptimal player whose interval includes unresolved segments, and if
this player is chosen next, then the cost of the unresolved segments she would set (”resolve”) is
at most OPT.
Proof: Let p be an intermediate strategy profile in the BR sequence. Consider the players
according to the order they deviate in some optimal BR sequence. Let i′ be the first player in this
order who is suboptimal in p. Since no player prior to i′ in the optimal sequence is suboptimal,
the segments that i′ would resolve by a deviation from p are a subset of the segments she resolves
in the optimal sequence. In the optimal sequence she obviously resolves these segments such
that the selected edges are of total cost at most OPT , and therefore this is an upper bound on
the total cost of unresolved segments she would set by deviating from p.
Using the above lemma, we provide tight analysis on the performance of Min-Path for SPPs
with multi-targets and single or multiple sources. Note that in a single-source instance, every
player resolves the prefix of the network corresponding to her interval.
Theorem 2.10 The inefficiency of Min-Path in SPP network formation games with single-
source and multi-targets is θ(m).
Proof: We show that the total cost determined for the segments resolved in every iteration is
at most OPT . Since at least one segment is resolved in each iteration, the whole network’s cost
is bounded by m · OPT . Let i be the i-th player chosen to deviate by Min-Path and assume i
has unresolved segments. Let i′ be the player guaranteed by Lemma 2.9. It may be that i = i′.
Both players have the same BR path in the resolved segments and therefore differ only in their
unresolved segments. Since Min-Path chose i, the cost of her unresolved segments is at most
the cost of i′’s unresolved segments, which is at most OPT by Lemma 2.9.
We show that the analysis is tight: Consider the network depicted in Figure 3. There are
n = m players, where ti is the target of player i. In the initial strategy profile for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
p0i = 〈e1, e2, . . . , ei−1, e′i〉. Note that in every segment, Ej , connecting tj−1 and tj , the upper
edge costs n− j and is used by the n− j players j + 1, ..., n and the lower edge costs 1 +  and
is used only by player j. Thus, the initial cost of player i is cp0i
(p0) =
∑
1≤j≤i−1
n−j
n−j + (1 + ) =
(i− 1) + (1 + ) = i+ .
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Figure 3: A network on which Min-Path has inefficiency Ω(m).
Clearly, in every segment, the players using the upper edge will benefit from deviating to
the lower one and the player using the lower edge will benefit from deviating to the upper one.
By Lemma 2.6, the first deviation will determine the edge that will be used in the NE reached.
Note that player i’s best response, is 〈e′1, e′2, . . . , e′i−1, ei〉 whose cost is
∑
1≤j≤i−1
(1+)+(n−i) =
(i− 1) · (1 + ) + (n− i) = n+ (i− 1) · . Player 1 will be chosen by the Min-Path deviator rule,
and will deviate to 〈e1〉. After this deviation e1 is included in the BR of all the players. We
can therefore consider the game induced by the nodes {t1, ..., tn}, treating t1 as the source. The
resulting game is similar to the initial one, and the same analysis shows that the second deviation
is of player i2 to 〈e1, e2〉. Repeating the process, we get that NE reached by Min-Path consists
of the edges {e1, e2, . . . , en−1, e′n} and therefore SC(NEMin−Path(p0)) =
∑
1≤j≤(n−1)
cej + ce′n =∑
1≤j≤(n−1)
(n− j) + 1 +  = (n− 1)n2 + 1 + .
On the other hand, another valid BR sequence is a one in which player n migrates first. Her
BR is deviating to all the lower edges. By Lemma 2.6, other players will follow and the BR
sequence will converge to {e′1, e′2, . . . , e′n} having SC = (1 + )
1≤j≤n
= n(1+). The ratio between the
two social costs is
(n−1)n
2
+1+
n(1+) →→0
(n−1)n
2
+1
n ≈ n2 . Since n = m, we conclude that the inefficiency
of Min-Path in SPP networks with single-source and multi-targets is θ(m).
We turn to consider arbitrary instances and show that Min-Path can perform poorly.
Theorem 2.11 The inefficiency of Min-Path in SPP network formation games with multi-
sources and multi-targets is θ(2m).
Proof: Let c(Ri) denote the total cost of resolved segments after i deviations of players
whose deviation resolved at least one segment. The segments that are resolved already in R0
will be included in the NE reached, therefore, c(R0) ≤ OPT . We prove that c(Ri)− c(Ri−1) ≤
c(Ri−1) +OPT for every i; i.e., c(Ri) ≤ 2c(Ri−1) +OPT . This implies that the total network’s
cost is c(Rm) ≤ 2m+1 ·OPT .
Let i be the ith player chosen to deviate by Min-Path that has some unresolved segments.
The total cost of the unresolved segments that i resolves is c(Ri) − c(Ri−1). Let i′ be a player
guaranteed by Lemma 3. Since i was chosen by Min-Path, the cost of i’s BR path is lower
than the cost of i′’s BR path. But the cost of i’s BR path is at least the cost of the unresolved
segments in i’s BR path. On the other hand, the cost of i′’s BR path equals the sum of
the cost of her resolved segments, which is bounded by c(Ri−1) and the cost she would set
to her unresolved segments, bounded by OPT (by Lemma 3). Putting it all together, we get
c(Ri)− c(Ri−1) ≤ c(BRi(p)) ≤ c(BRi′(p)) ≤ c(Ri−1) +OPT , as required.
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Figure 4: Min-Path lower bound for multi-sources multi-targets SPP.
Every edge is labelled by its cost and the number of players using it in the initial strategy profile. E.g., the edge
e′1 costs 2
m and is used by 2m−1 players in the initial strategy profile.
We show that the bound is tight: Consider the network depicted in Figure 4. There are
2m−1 +m players as follows: For 1 ≤ i ≤ m: The source of player i is si = vi−1 and her target
is ti = vi. i’s initial strategy is p
0
i = ei. Therefore, there is one player in each segment of
the network who uses the lower edge. There are 2m−1 other players, the ”upper-players”, with
objective 〈v0, vm〉 who use the upper path 〈e′1, ..., e′m〉. For every segment Ei, the BR path of
player i is 〈e′i〉, since
ce′
i
xe′
i
+1 =
2m+i−1
2m−1+1 < 2
i =
cei
xei
and the BR path of the upper-players is the
lower path since
cei
xei+1
= 2
j
1+1 = 2
j−1 < 2
m+j−1
2m−1 =
ce′
i
xe′
i
.
An optimal BR sequence start by a deviation of an upper-player to the lower path 〈e1, ...em〉,
after that deviation all the players 1 ≤ i ≤ m do not have a beneficial deviation and all the
other upper-players will follow. The NE will be 〈e1, ...em〉, whose cost OPT =
∑
1≤j≤m cj =∑
1≤j≤m 2
j = 2m+1 − 2.
Consider now the BR sequence induced by the Min-Path deviator rule. Notice that for
two players 1 ≤ i1 < i2 ≤ m, the BR-paths costs satisfy c(BRi1(p0)) = c(e′i1) = 2m+i1−1 <
2m+i2−1 = c(e′i2) = c(BRi2(p
0)). The cost of the BR path of the upper-players is
∑
1≤j≤m cej =∑
1≤j≤m 2
j = 2m+1 − 2. Thus, Player 1 whose BR path cost 2m will be chosen first. After her
migration to e′1, the BR path of the upper players becomes 〈e′1, e2, ..., em〉. The cost of this path
is 2m +
∑
2≤j≤m 2
j = 2m + 2m+1 − 2 > 2m+1 = ce′2 = c(BR2(p1)), and therefore the second
player to migrate will be Player 2.
Continuing in the same manner, the first i < m migrations are of players 1, ..., i and the BR
path of the upper-players is 〈e′1, ..., e′i, ei+1, ..., em〉, having cost
∑
1≤j≤i 2
m+j−1+
∑
i+1≤j≤m 2
j =
(2m+i−1−∑1≤j≤m−1 2j)+(2m+1−1−∑1≤j≤i 2j) = (2m+i−1−2m+1)+(2m+1−1−2i+1+1) =
2m+i+2m−2i+ 1 > 2m+i. Player i+1 is the minimal of the first m players that did not deviate
and her BR path’s cost is ce′i+1 = 2
m+i, so the Min-Path deviator rule will choose player i+ 1.
We conclude by induction that Min-Path deviator rule will select the players in order 1, ...,m,
and the NE that will be reached is 〈e′1, ..., e′m〉, having SC(NEMin−Path(p0)) =
∑
1≤j≤m 2
m+j−1 =
2m−1 ·∑1≤j≤m 2j = 2m−1 · (2m+1− 1) = 22m− 2m−1. The inefficiency of Min-Path in this game
is 2
2m−2m−1
2m+1−2 = Ω(2
m).
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2.4 Local Rules for Extension Parallel Graphs
We now show that the inefficiency of any local deviator rule is as high as the PoA, namely, Ω(n),
even in the restricted class of EP networks. Recall that the state vector of a player consists of
the player’s cost in her current profile and in the profile obtained by a deviation of the player,
and the total cost of the path used by the player in the two profiles.
Theorem 2.12 For the class of single-source network formation games played on extension-
parallel networks, the inefficiency of every local deviator rule is Ω(n).
Proof: Consider the network depicted in Figure 5(a). There are n players, all sharing the
source s, and the targets are as depicted in the figure. Consider the following profile:
• Player 1 uses the path 〈e1〉.
• Player 2 uses the path 〈e1, e2〉.
• Players 3, 4 use the path 〈e3〉.
• Players 5, . . . , n use the path 〈e5〉.
𝑐𝑒1 = 24 
𝑥𝑒1 = 2 
 
s t2,3,4 t5,..,n 
t1 
(𝑎) 
s t2,3,4 t5,..,n 
t1 
(𝑏) 
𝑐𝑒2 = 10 
𝑥𝑒2 = 1 
 
𝑐𝑒3 = 30 
𝑥𝑒3 = 2 
 
𝑐𝑒4 = 0 
𝑥𝑒4 = 0 
 
𝑐𝑒5 = 7.4(𝑛 − 4) 
𝑥𝑒5 = 𝑛 − 4 
 
𝑐𝑒5 = 6.5(𝑛 − 4) 
𝑥𝑒5 = 𝑛 − 4 
 
𝑐𝑒3 = 30 
𝑥𝑒3 = 2 
 
𝑐𝑒4 = 0 
𝑥𝑒4 = 0 
 
𝑐𝑒1 = 24 
𝑥𝑒1 = 2 
 
𝑐𝑒2 = 10 
𝑥𝑒2 = 1 
 𝑐𝑒6 = 10 
𝑥𝑒6 = 1 
 
Figure 5: A local deviator rule fails (a) if v2 is preferred, and (b) if v3 is preferred.
Every edge is labelled by the edge cost and the number of players using it in the initial strategy profile. E.g., the
edge e1 costs 24 and is used by two players in the initial strategy profile.
Consider player 2, who uses the path 〈e1, e2〉. Her current cost is 22 (she shares the cost of
edge e1 with player 1 and pays fully for edge e2), the total cost of her path is 34, her post-deviation
cost is 10 (obtained by deviating to e3, and sharing this cost with players 3, 4), and the total
cost of her post-deviation path is 30. Thus, the state vector of player 2 is v2 = (22, 34, 10, 30).
Similarly, one can verify that the state vector of player 3 (or player 4) is v3 = (15, 30, 13, 34)
(obtained by deviating to the path 〈e1, e2〉). The suboptimal players in this profile are players 2
and 3 (or 4). If the deviator rule chooses the state vector v2 over v3, then player 2 will deviate
to e3, reaching a NE whose social cost is 54 + 7.4(n− 4). On the other hand, if the deviator rule
chooses the state vector v3 over v2, then player 3 will deviate to 〈e1, e2〉, and from this point on
all players will deviate to 〈e1, e2〉, reaching a NE whose social cost is 34. We conclude that a
deviator rule that prefers v2 over v3 reaches an inefficiency of
54+7.4(n−4)
34 = Ω(n).
Consider next the network depicted in Figure 5(b). There are n players, all sharing the
source s, and the targets are as depicted in the figure. Consider the following profile:
• Player 1 uses the path 〈e1, e2〉.
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• Player 2 uses the path 〈e1, e6〉.
• Players 3, 4 use the path 〈e3〉.
• Players 5, . . . , n use the path 〈e5〉.
One can verify that the state vector of player 2 (or 1) is v2 = (22, 34, 10, 30) (where the best
response is a deviation to 〈e3〉), and the state vector of player 3 (and 4) is v3 = (15, 30, 13, 34)
(where the best response is a deviation to 〈e1, e2〉). These are the only suboptimal players. By
the previous scenario, in order to avoid an inefficiency of Ω(n), the deviator rule must choose v3
over v2. If player 3 deviates, then she deviates to 〈e1, e2〉. After this deviation, players 4 and 2
will also deviate to 〈e1, e2〉, but the n−4 players will stay in their original path (for a cost of 6.5
each, compared to 6.8 upon deviation), resulting in a social cost of 34 + 6.5(n− 4). In contrast,
a deviator rule that chooses v2 over v3 will result in players 1 and 2 deviating to 〈e3〉, followed
by the n− 4 bottom players deviating to 〈e3, e4〉. This leads to a social cost of 30, so a deviator
rule that prefers v3 over v2 results in an inefficiency of
34+6.5(n−4)
30 = Ω(n). We conclude that
any local deviator rule has inefficiency of Ω(n).
2.5 Weighted Symmetric Network Formation Games on Parallel-Edge Graphs
A weighted symmetric resource selection network formation game [1, 26], also known as a network
formation game with weighted players on parallel 〈s, t〉 links, is a game in which the players are
weighted, and all players have the same set of singleton strategies. Formally, each player i has
a weight wi > 0, and her contribution to the load of the (single) resource she uses as well as her
payment are multiplied by wi, i.e., if an edge with cost ce is shared by k players with weights
w1, w2, . . . , wk then player i pays
wi∑k
j=1 wj
· ce.
In Section 2.5.1 we prove that it is NP-hard to find a deviator rule with inefficiency lower
than 32 , and in Section 2.5.2 we show that no local rule can guarantee a constant efficiency. In
Section 2.5.3 we show that while being optimal for unweighted games, Min-Path has inefficiency
n in weighted symmetric games, even if the weights are arbitrarily close to each other.
2.5.1 Hardness Result
We first consider the computational complexity of finding a good BR sequence, and show that
it is NP-hard to find one, or even to achieve inefficiency at most 32 .
Theorem 2.13 In weighted network formation games on parallel edge networks, it is NP-hard
to find a deviator rule with inefficiency at most 32 .
Proof: We show a reduction from the Partition problem: Given a set of numbers {a1, a2, ..., an}
such that
∑
i∈[n] ai = 2, the goal is to find a subset I ⊆ [n] such that
∑
i∈I ai =
∑
i∈[n]\I ai = 1.
This problem is NP-hard even if it is known that such a subset I exists. Given an instance
of Partition, such that for some I ⊆ [n], it holds that ∑i∈I ai = 1, construct the network and
initial profile depicted in Figure 6(a). Specifically, the instance consists of n + 8 players using
four parallel links as follows:
• e1 has a large cost C and is used by one player of weight 2, denoted the 2-player.
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Figure 6: The network constructed in the reduction from Partition.
(a) is the initial configuration, and (b) is the configuration before the migration of the 2-player. The labels on an
edge give its cost, and the set of weights of the players assigned to it. E.g., the cost of edge e3 in profile (a) is
9 +  and it is used by 6 players of weight 1.
• e2 has cost 3 +  and is shared by n players with the weights {ai}ni=1 corresponding to the
Partition instance.
• e3 has cost 9 +  and is shared by 6 unit-weight players.
• e4 has cost 2 and is not used by any player.
The following claim completes the proof.
Claim 2.14 Let I be a subset of [n] such that
∑
i∈I ai = 1. A deviator rule that knows I can
determine a BR-sequence that ends up with a NE whose social cost is 2. If I is not detected then
the final NE will have social cost more than 3.
Proof: Assume that a set I ⊂ [n] s.t. ∑i∈I ai = 1 is known. Observe the BR-sequence that
starts by migrations of the players in I, and then the player with weight 2. Note that migrating
to e4 incurs a cost of 2 which is more than their current cost
c2
l2
· ai = 3+2 · ai < 2, for ai < 1.
The BR of the first player is e3 since
9+
6 <
3+
2 . Also, after the first player it would be even
more beneficial to the others to follow. After the players in I deviate, the optimal BR sequence
let the player with weight 2 migrate. The load on e2 at this time point is 1, and the load on
e3 is 7. So the costs the 2-player would incur by deviating to e2, e3 and e4 are
3+
3 · 2, 9+9 · 2
and 2, respectively. Each of the first two alternatives is strictly larger than 2, and therefore, the
2-player will migrate to e4. It is easy to verify that all the unit-weight players will follow and
then all the other players. The NE that will be reached is the edge e4 which is clearly optimal.
For the other side of the reduction proof, assume that there exists a BR sequence converging
to a NE with SC = 2. Such a sequence must converge to e4. Our proof is based on analyzing
the conditions required for having e4 the BR of some player for the first time. Specifically, we
show that the 2-player is the only one whose BR move may utilize e4, and that this can happen
if and only if the loads on e2 and e3 are exactly 1 and 7 respectively. First note that as long as
e4 is not utilized, each of the players on e2 and e3 either pays less than 2 or has a BR with cost
that is less than 2. Therefore, e4 can be the BR only of the 2-player. Denote by l2 and l3 the
loads (total weight) on e2 and e3 when the 2-player performs BR and migrate to e4. Given that
e4 is the BR of the 2-player it must hold that 2 · c2l2+2 > 2 and 2 · c3l3+2 > 2. Substituting the
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Figure 7: A feature-based deviator rule fails (a) if v2 is prioritized, and (b) if v1 is prioritized.
The labels on an edge give its name, its cost, and the set of weights of the players assigned to it in p0. The
labels on an edge give its cost, and the set of weights of the players assigned to it. E.g., the cost of edge e3 in
profile (a) is r and it is used by (r2 + r) players of weight 1.
costs of e2 and e3, we get l2 < 1 +  and l3 < 7 + . Since  can be arbitrarily small, as shown
in Figure 6(b), these conditions can only be fulfilled if players of total weight exactly 1 have
migrated from e2 to e3. This set of players corresponds to a subset I in the Partition instance
whose total sum is 1. Thus, converging to a NE with SC = 2, must involve a detection of the
subset I. Moreover, since the second-best NE has SC = 3 + , we conclude that any deviator
rule with inefficiency 32 , must be able to exactly solve the partition problem.
2.5.2 Local Deviator Rules
Our bad news continue with a negative result referring to any local deviator rule. Recall that in
weighted network formation games, the state vector of a player includes her weight, her current
cost, her strategy’s cost, her cost after performing BR, and the cost of her BR strategy.
Theorem 2.15 Any local deviator rule has inefficiency Ω(
√
n) in weighted network formation
games on parallel-edges networks.
Proof: Given r, we show that no local deviator rule has inefficiency lower than r/2. Consider
the game Ga depicted in Figure 7(a).
The network consists of three parallel edges. The upper edge, e1 has a very high cost, C,
and is used only by Player 1 whose weight is w1 = 2. The middle edge, e2 costs 1 and is used
by r unit-weight players 2, ..., r+ 1. The lower edge, e3 costs r and is used by r
2 + r unit-weight
players r+ 2, ..., r2 + 2r+ 1, each has weight wi =
r
r+1 , i ∈ {2, ..., r+ 1}. The suboptimal players
in p0 are the players on e1 and e2. Since
1
r+2 <
r
r2+r+2
the BR of Player 1 is 〈e2〉. Also, since
r
r2+r+1
< 1r , a deviation to 〈e3〉 is the BR of Player 2 and all its equivalents. Observe the state
vectors corresponding to Player 1 and Player 2: Player 1 currently pays C for a path that costs
C, and after a deviation to its BR path e2 will pay
2
r+2 for a path that costs 1. Her weight is 2
and therefore v1 = (C,C,
2
r+2 , 1, 2). One can verify that the corresponding state vector of Player
2 is v2 = (
1
r , 1,
r
r2+r+1
, r, 1) (obtained by a deviation to e3).
If a deviator rule prefers v1 over v2 then the resulting NE will be 〈e2〉, since no player on e2
will be suboptimal after the first deviation. On the other hand, if v2 is chosen then after her
deviation the only BR path is e3 and the resulting NE will be 〈e3〉. We conclude that in order
to achieve inefficiency less than r, the deviator rule must choose v1 over v2.
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Consider now the gameGb depicted in Figure 7(b). It extends the gameGa with an additional
edge e4 whose cost is
2
r +  and a single player r
2 + 2r+ 2 having weight wr2+2r+2 =
4
r . We show
that in this game, a deviator rule must choose v2 in order to reach an efficient NE. Note that
for sufficiently large r and respectively sufficiently small ,
2
r + 
4
r + 1
=
2 +  · r
r + 4
>
r
r2 + r + 1
and
2
r + 
4
r + 2
=
1 +  · r2
r + 2
>
1
r + 2
.
Therefore, the new edge e4 is not the BR choice of any player and the state vectors of the players
on e1 and e2 remain v1 and v2 as in the game Ga. We show that an efficient NE is achieved if
and only if a player on e2 plays first.
If the 4r -player is chosen to deviate first, she will select 〈e3〉 as her best response, since
r
r2+r+ 4
r
= 1
r+1+ 4
r2
< 1
r+ 4
r
. After this deviation 〈e4〉 is the least profitable choice, and therefore
a NE consisting of 〈e4〉 will not be reached. The players on e3 are not suboptimal in p0, and
therefore, will never be selected to play first. If v1 is chosen, then similar to Ga, we will end up
with a NE consisting of 〈e3〉.
An optimal BR sequence chooses v2 and let a unit player from e2 migrate to e3. Then, Player
1 is selected. Since
2
r
+
4
r
+2
=
1+· r
2
r+2 < min{ 1r−1+2 , rr2+r+1+2} she will choose the lower cheapest
path 〈e4〉. The unit-players will then follow, leading to SC = 2r .
We conclude that in order to avoid inefficiency r2 , in each of the games, an optimal deviator
rule must choose a different deviator among the players corresponding to state vectors v1 and
v2. Therefore, any local deviator rule has inefficiency at least
r
2 = Ω(
√
n).
2.5.3 The Performance of Min-Path in Weighted Network Formation Games
Weighted network formation games on parallel-edges networks can be extended to weighted
symmetric games with strategies consisting of two resources (a 2-segment SPP). By
[2], these are potential games and any BR sequence converges to a NE. In Theorem 2.5 we
showed that the deviator rule Min-Path ensures the optimal reachable NE in the unit-weight
symmetric games. We show that with weighted players, the inefficiency of Min-Path can be as
bad as the PoA even if the weights are arbitrarily close to each other, and the strategies are sets
of two resources.
Theorem 2.16 The Min-Path deviator rule in weighted network formation games on a 2-
segment SPP have inefficiency Ω(n). This holds even if the ratio maxiwi/miniwi is arbitrarily
close to 1.
Proof: Let k > 2 be an integer, and let l = 1 + 2k and r = l · k = k + 2. Consider the
SPP network consisting of two segments, E1 and E2, depicted in Figure 8. The game consists
of r − 1 + rl = 2k + 1 players in the following initial configuration:
• rl = k players with weights l, denoted l-players. Each of these players is using an edge
with a cost of 2r that only she is using in E1 and the upper edge in E2.
• r− 1 unit-weights players. Each of these players is using the lower edge in E1 and an edge
of cost 2r that only she is using in E2.
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Figure 8: An instance for which Min-Path ensures no finite inefficiency.
Every edge is labelled by its cost and the weights of players using it.
We calculate the players’ BR in this configuration. The BR edge of the l-players in E1 is the
lower one since for sufficiently small :
2r
2l
· l = r > r · k + 2
k + 2 + 2k
+ 
l
(r − 1) + l = r ·
l · k
(r − 1) + l + 
l
(r − 1) + l =
r(r − 2) + 
(r − 1) + l · l.
The BR edge of the l-players in E2 is one of the lower edges since
r2
r · l = r · l > 2rl+1 · l. Thus, the
BR path of every l-player is migrating to lower edges, and therefore the cost of their BR path
is r(r − 2) + + 2r = r2 + . The unit-weight players’ BR edge in E1 is an upper edge since
r(r − 2) + 
r − 1 >
r(r − 2)
r − 1 = r ·
k
k + 1
= r · 2
1 + 1 + 2k
=
2r
l + 1
.
The BR edge in E2 for a unit-weight player is the upper one since
r2
r+1 <
2r
1+1 . Thus, the BR
path of the unit-weight players is the upper edges, and therefore the cost of their BR path is
2r + r2. For  < r it holds that 2r + r2 > r2 + ; therefore, the Min-Path deviator rule will let
an l-player whose BR is minimal migrate first. It is easy to see that the unit-weight players will
join this path and the NE reached by Min-Path consists of the lower edge in the left segment
and one of the lower edges in the right segment. That implies, SC(NEMin−Path(p0)) = r2 + .
We show that a better BR sequence exists. Consider a BR sequence that starts by a migration
of a unit-weight player, followed by a migration of all the l-players whose edge in the first segment
was not the one migrated to. After the migration of the unit-weight player the loads on the
edges she migrated to are l + 1 in E1, and r + 1 in E2. It is easy to verify that for sufficiently
large k,
2r
2l + 1
· l = r · 2l
2l + 1
= r · 2k + 4
3k + 4
< r · k
k + 1 + 2k
= r · r − 2
r − 2 + l <
r(r − 2) + 
r − 2 + l
so all of the l-players will follow the first migration in E1. Also, the BR edge for an l-player in
E2 is a lower edge, since
2r
1 + l
= r · 1
1 + 1k
< r · 1
1 + 1k+2
= r · r
r + 1
=
r2
r + 1
.
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It is easy to verify that after the migration of an l-player, her chosen path, of cost 2r + 2r,
will remain the BR path of all the l-players and afterwards it becomes the BR path of the
unit-weight players as well. Therefore, there exists a BR sequence that converges to a NE with
social cost 4r. We conclude,
SC(NEMin−Path(p0))
SC(p?(p0))
≥ r
2 + 
4r
>
r
4
=
k + 2
4
>
k
4
Note that the number of players is n = rl + (r − 1) < 2r = 2k + 4. Since k can be arbitrarily
large, we conclude αGMin−Path = Ω(n). Thus, Min-Path ensures no finite inefficiency. Note that
l can be arbitrarily close to 1. This implies that our bound is valid even if the ratio between the
maximal and the minimal weights is arbitrarily close to 1.
3 Job Scheduling Games
Job scheduling games are resource selection congestion games corresponding to scenarios in
which each player controls a job and needs to select a machine to process the job. We consider
two models:
1. Every job is associated with a length wi corresponding to its processing time. The load
on a machine Mj in a schedule p is the total processing time of the jobs assigned to it.
That is, Lj(p) =
∑
i:pi=Mj
wi. The latency function is linear, thus, the cost of job i in a
schedule p is ci(p) = Lpi(p) [38].
2. Congestion has conflicting effects ([23, 10]). Jobs have unit processing time and machines
have an activation cost B. The cost function of job i in a schedule p consists of two
components: the load on the job’s machine and the job’s share in the machine’s activation
cost. Formally, the cost of job i in a schedule p where pi = Mj is ci(p) = Lj(p) +B/Lj(p).
3.1 Weighted Jobs on Parallel Identical Machines
In what follows we show that no local deviator rule has inefficiency better than the PoA (which
is known to be 2mm+1 [24]). Recall that the state vector we use consist of the job’s length, its
machine and the machines’ loads.
Theorem 3.1 The inefficiency of every local deviator rule is 2mm+1 .
Proof: Assume, by a way of contradiction, that there is a local deviator rule whose inefficiency
is better than the PoA. Given m, let  be a small constant such that (m+ 12)/(
3
2) is an integer.
The proof consists of two games, one can verify that both have the same initial loads profile.
Consider first an instance with the following initial schedule, depicted in Figure 9(a):
• L1(p0) = 2m− . M1 processes two jobs of length m−  and one job of length .
• L2(p0) = m+ 12. M2 processes a job of length m−  and a job of length 32.
• L3(p0) = m− 2. M3 processes m−2 jobs of length .
• Lj(p0) = m, for every machine Mj , 4 ≤ j ≤ m, each processing a single job of length m.
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Figure 9: The initial profile for which (a) prioritizing v′, or (b) prioritizing v′′ leads to inefficiency
2m
m+1 = PoA.
The only suboptimal jobs are the ones on M1 and the job of length
3
2 on M2. The state vector
of each of the (m − )-jobs on M1 is v′ = (m − , 1).2 The state vector of the -job on M1 is
vˆ = (, 1). The state vector of the suboptimal job on M2 is v
′′ = (32, 2). If a deviator rule prefers
v′′ over v′ then the short job on M2 will migrate to M3. Then, the only beneficial migration is
of a job from M1 to M2, leading to a NE with makespan 2m− 2 (on either M1 or M2). If the
deviator rule prefers vˆ then the -job on M1 will deviate to reach a NE with makespan 2m− 2.
On the other hand, an optimal deviator rule selects v′, and let one of the jobs of length m−
migrate to M3. Then, the -jobs from M3 will spread among the machines, and the resulting
NE would have makespan m+
m− 5
2

m = m+ 1− 52m .
We conclude that a deviator rule that prefers v′′ or vˆ has inefficiency 2m−2
m+1− 5
2m
→
→0
2m
m+1 .
Consider now the following initial schedule, depicted in Figure 9(b).
• L1(p0) = 2m− . M1 processes two jobs, one job of length m−  and one job of length m.
• L2(p0) = m+ 12. M2 processes
m+ 1
2

3
2

jobs of length 32.
• L3(p0) = m− 2. M3 processes one job of length m− 2.
• Lj(p0) = m, for every machine Mj , 4 ≤ j ≤ m, each processing a single job of length m.
Again, the only suboptimal jobs are the ones on M1 and M2. If a local deviator rule chooses
v′′ then a job of length 32 on M2 migrates first. It will migrate to M3 and then the job of length
m−  on M1 will migrate to M2, whose load, m−  is the lightest. Then, all the jobs of length
3
2 on M2 will spread among the machines and a NE with makaspan m+ 1− 52m will be reached.
On the other hand, a deviator rule that does not choose v′′, chooses a job on M1. If it chooses
the job of length m− , whose state vector is v′, it would migrate to M3. A NE is reached after
this single migration and has makespan 2m− 2. Alternatively, if the job of length m is chosen
first, it migrates to M3 and afterwards the only beneficial migration is of the job of length m−2
to M1. Again, we will end up with makespan 2m− 2.
2For better readability we omit the machines’ loads from the state vectors, ind include only the jobs’ length
and the index of its machines.
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We conclude that for this instance, the deviator rule must choose v′′ in order to achieve
inefficiency better than 2mm+1 . Since this conflicts with the optimal choice for the first instance,
no local rule ensures inefficiency better than 2mm+1 .
We note that this result captures several common natural deviator rules in job scheduling
games, such as selecting a longest job, a job having max-cost, or a job whose BR causes the
max-improvement.
3.2 Job Scheduling Games with Conflicting Congestions Effects
In this section we consider scheduling of unit-size jobs on identical machines. The machines are
associated with an activation cost, B. For a given profile p, the load on machine j, denoted
Lj(p), is the number of jobs assigned to it. The cost function of job i in a given schedule is the
sum of two components: the load on i’s machine and i’s share in the machine’s activation cost.
The activation cost B is shared equally between all the jobs assigned to a particular machine.
That is, given a profile p in which pi = Mj , the cost of job i is ci(p) = Lj(p) +
B
Lj(p)
.
We denote the cost of a job assigned to a machine with load x by c(x), where c(x) = x+ Bx .
As [22] showed, the cost function exhibits the following structure.
Observation 3.2 The function c(x) = x + B/x for x > 0 attains its minimum at x =
√
B, is
decreasing for x ∈ (0,√B), and increasing for x > √B.
Denote by l∗ the load minimizing the players’ cost. Thus, l∗ = arg minl∈{b√Bc,d√Be} c(l),
with tie breaking in favor of the lower option. For a given profile p, let M(p) denote the active
machines in p, that is, M(p) = {j : Lj(p) > 0}, and let m(p) = |M(p)|. Among the machines
in M(p), a machine that has load at least (respectively, smaller than) l∗ is said to be a high
(low) machine. By Observation 3.2, the BR of any migrating job, is either the most loaded low
machine, or the least loaded high machine. Since the jobs are identical, all the jobs assigned on
a specific machine incurs the same cost. Thus, when analyzing BR-deviations, we assume that
a deviator rule is a function S : P →M(p) that given a profile p, chooses a machine rather than
a job. One arbitrary player assigned to the chosen machine then performs a BR move. We also
refer to machines, rather than jobs, as being suboptimal. A machine is suboptimal if the jobs it
processes are suboptimal. Finally, we assume that the activation cost, B, is a known parameter
that can be used by the deviator rule.
We first show that in any NE profile, the machines are balanced. Formally:
Claim 3.3 In a job scheduling game with activation cost B and unit-length jobs, in any p ∈ NE,
every active machine is assigned
⌈
n
m(p)
⌉
or
⌊
n
m(p)
⌋
jobs.
Proof: Assume by contradiction that in some NE profile p the machines are not balanced,
that is, there are two machines having loads l and l′ such that l + 2 ≤ l′. It must be that the
machine having load l is low while the machine having load l′ is high, as otherwise, if both are
low then a migration to the higher one is beneficial, and if both are high, then a migration to
the lower one is beneficial, contradicting the stability of p. Moreover, since p is a NE, we have
c(l′) ≤ c(l+ 1) and c(l) ≤ c(l′ + 1). Since the cost function increases on high machines, we have
c(l′) < c(l′ + 1), that is, l′ + Bl′ < l
′ + 1 + Bl′+1 , implying that B < l
′(l′ + 1).
By the definition of the cost function, c(l′) = c(Bl′ ). Recall that the cost function is decreasing
for x ≤ l + 1 and note that Bl′ ≤ l + 1. Since c(Bl′ ) = c(l′) ≤ c(l + 1), we conclude l + 1 ≤ Bl′ .
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Similarly, the cost function is increasing for x > l′ and Bl+1 ≥ l′. Since c(l′) ≤ c(l+1) = c( Bl+1) we
conclude l′ ≤ Bl+1 . Combining both inequalities we get Bl′+1− Bl′ ≥ 1, which implies B ≥ l′(l′+1).
A contradiction.
The following results characterize BR sequences and NE profiles.
Claim 3.4 In an instance of scheduling games with conflicting congestion effects, an optimal
NE is one in which the number of active machines is maximal.
Proof: Let B be the activation cost. We first note that no profile with two low machines
is stable - since, by Observation 3.2, jobs from a low machine would benefit from migrating to
a more (or equally) loaded low machine. By Claim 3.2, the loads in a NE are either
⌈
n
m(p)
⌉
or⌊
n
m(p)
⌋
. Therefore, increasing m(p) lowers the loads and, by Observation 3.2, also the costs for
n
m(p) ≥ l∗. If there exist p ∈ NE such that l∗− 1 < nm(p) < l∗ then some machines will have load
l∗ − 1 and the others will have loads l∗. Since p is stable c(l∗ − 1) ≤ c(l∗ + 1) and therefore any
NE with less machines will have some machines with load at least l∗ + 1 and therefore higher
social cost. If nm(p) ≤ l∗− 1 then it must be that n < l∗ and the only NE is on a single machine.
If there is more than a single active machine then there are two low machines, and, as we already
pointed out, p cannot be stable.
In the following analysis we assume that the ordering of machines by load relations is fixed,
that is, if Lj1(p
0) ≤ Lj2(p0) then throughout dynamics the same order remains. This assumption
is w.l.o.g., since we can always relabel the machines. To avoid this relabelling we assume that
whenever a job migrates to a machine having load x it joins the machine having highest index
among the machines having load x. We begin with a simple observation.
Observation 3.5 If a machine Mj is high in the initial profile, then for every p ∈ NE(p0),
Mj ∈ M(p). Also, if a job migrates to a machine Mj during a BR sequence, then Mj will be
active in the final profile.
Proof: An active machine is not in M(p) if it is emptied out. However, the load of a high
machine will never decrease below l∗ since this load incurs the minimum possible cost, and none
of the jobs assigned to Mj when its load is l
∗ is suboptimal. For the second part, let Mj be a
BR machine. If Mj is high, then it will not be emptied out as we just showed. If Mj is low, then
since the cost function is decreasing for load at most l∗, then Mj will remain the best response
until it becomes high, and will not be emptied out once it reaches load l∗.
The next lemma states a sufficient and necessary condition for a low machine to remain
active in the NE profile. We assume by relabelling that L1(p
0) ≤ L2(p0) ≤ ... ≤ Lm(p0). Denote
li = Li(p
0).
Claim 3.6 For every initial profile p0, and every Mj ∈ M(p0), there exists p ∈ NE(p0) in
which Mj ∈M(p) iff j = m or n−ljm−j > Blj+1 .
Proof: Note that Mm is the most loaded machine in p
0. If it is high in p0 then by Observation
3.5, it will remain active. If it is low, then p0 consists only of low machines, and by our relabeling
assumption, at least Mm will remain active.
We turn to analyze a machine Mj for j < m. We first show that if Mj fulfills the condition,
then there exists a BR sequence in which it is not emptied out. Let l¯ ≡ n−ljm−j > Blj+1 . If Mj is
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high then the claim follows from Observation 3.5. Assume that Mj is low in p
0. Note that all
the machines Mlower = {M1, ...,Mj−1} are suboptimal because they are low and also lower than
Mj , thus, their jobs can benefit from migrating to Mj . Consider a BR sequence that starts by
migrations out of Mlower. If a job chooses to migrate to Mj , then, by Observation 3.5 we are
done. Otherwise, after the machines in Mlower are empty, the BR sequence proceeds by selecting
higher machines. Note that along this sequence, there is always some higher machine Mk for
k > j with load at least l¯. Since c(lj + 1) = c(
B
lj+1
) < c(l¯), a migration from Mk to Mj or to a
more attractive machine is beneficial for Mk. Thus, by choosing the highest suboptimal machine
to perform BR, the machines higher than Mj will become balanced, causing Mj to become the
highest low machine and a best-response. By Observation 3.5, once this happens, Mj remains
active in the resulting NE.
We turn to show that Mj must be emptied out if
n−lj
m−j ≥ Blj+1 . Let Mhigher = {Mj+1, ...,Mm}.
The average load on machines in Mhigher is lower than
B
lj+1
. While there are machines lower
than Mj (Mlower 6= ∅ ), since the average of loads of Mhigher is lower than Blj+1 , there must
be at least one machine in Mhigher with load l
′ s.t lj ≤ l′ < Blj+1 − 1 (the subtraction of 1
is because of the smallest machine). That machine will be a better response than Mj since
c(lj + 1) = c(
B
lj+1
) > c(l′ + 1) or, if lj = l′, since it has a higher index. Afterwards, when Mj
is the lowest machine, if there is a higher low machine, it is more attractive than Mj , and if
there are only high machines, then even if they are balanced, some high machine will have load
less than Blj+1 and therefore Mj is not a best-response, since c(lj) = c(
B
lj
) > c( Blj+1). After the
machines in Mhigher are balanced, the jobs on Mj will leave it and it will be emptied.
We use the above characterization to devise an optimal local deviator rule.
An Optimal Deviator Rule: We present an optimal local deviator rule. A BR sequence
applied with this rule will converge to a NE profile with a maximal possible number of active
machines, and will therefore have the optimal social cost.
Algorithm 1 Sopt - an optimal local deviator rule
1: Given a profile p, let l1 ≤ l2 ≤ · · · ≤ lm(p) be its vector profile.
2: If Mm(p) is a high machine (that is, lm(p) ≥ l∗) and it is suboptimal then return Mm(p).
3: Else if M1 is suboptimal return M1
4: Else p is a NE.
Theorem 3.7 Algorithm Sopt is optimal for every activation cost B and every initial profile p
0
of a job scheduling game with conflicting congestion effects.
Proof: We prove that a machine that stays active in an optimal BR sequence will remain
active by Sopt. Let Mi be such a machine. If LMi ≥ l∗ then by Observation 3.5 it will remain
active. Otherwise, when Mi is considered to be chosen by Sopt, all the machines with lower loads
have been emptied since the rule considers only the lowest machine. Since Mi remains active
in an optimal sequence, by Claim 3.6
n−lMi
m−i >
B
lMi+1
and therefore there is a high machine with
load at least BlMi+1
+ 1 that will be preferred by Sopt.
One may wonder whether deviator rules with poor inefficiency exist in this game. In Ap-
pendix B we show an instance for which a natural deviator rule has inefficiency Ω(B
1
3 ) and
therefore a constant inefficiency is not trivial to ensure.
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4 Conclusions and Open Problems
A desired property of congestion games is that best-response dynamics always converges to a
pure Nash equilibrium. However, the order in which players are chosen to perform their best-
response moves is crucial to the quality of the equilibrium reached. Unlike previous work, our
focus is not on the dynamic’s termination or its convergence time, but on the quality of the
achieved Nash equilibrium. Starting from a given profile, two different deviation orders can
possibly lead to two different equilibria that differ a lot in their quality. We introduce a new
(worst-case) measure for quantifying the inefficiency of a deviator rule — a rule that selects a
suboptimal player to perform BR move, and thus, induces the way BRD advance and converge.
In other words, we analyze the ability of a centralized authority that can control the order
according to which players perform their best-responses, to lead the players to a good stable
profile.
We define the inefficiency of a deviator rule S as the largest ratio, among all initial profiles
p0 of a game, between the social cost of the worst NE reachable by S and the social cost of the
best NE reachable from p0. We study deviator rules in network formation and job scheduling
games. Our main interest is in deviator rules that are easy to implement and are local in a sense
that the information they use about the current profile is limited and based on a restricted set
of parameters (referred to as ”state vectors”), but we study general deviator rules as well.
We present both positive and negative results for local and global deviator rules in these
games. Our positive results show that in some games, even if players act strategically, controlling
the order in which they play can have a significant effect on the quality of the outcome. We
show that Min-Path is optimal for symmetric network formation games and present a deviator
rule that is optimal for job scheduling game with conflicting congestion effects. Furthermore, we
show a dynamic programming based global (non-local) deviator rule that is optimal for network
formation games with an underlying SPP network. Our analysis suggest some negative results
as well.
Our negative results imply that it would be hard for a central authority to lead the game
to a good outcome. We show that in network formation games played on EP networks no local
deviator rule can ensure outcome that is better than the PoA, as well as in job scheduling games
with identical machines and only negative congestion effect. We also show that it is NP-hard
to find optimal outcome in weighted symmetric network formation games, even in the simplest
possible network topology (consisting of parallel edges between the source and target nodes).
Additional results shows tight bounds that lie strictly between 1 and the PoA. In network
formation games Min-Path ensures O(m) inefficiency in single-source instances for SPP networks
and O(2m) inefficiency for SPP networks with players corresponding to a proper intervals graph.
Our research can be naturally extended to consider additional state vectors in the games we
consider. Furthermore, our measure can be studied in additional games of interest.
We suggest a few directions for future research:
First, our results show that taking worst case approach over all initial strategy profiles can
lead to negative results that do not distinguish properly between different deviator rules. One
way to address this is restricting the initial strategy profile or analysing the inefficiency for
different subsets of initial strategy profiles. Such an analysis may suggest a range of deviator
rules, each performing well on different initial profiles, and selected to be used based on some of
the initial profile’s properties. Another way to address the problem is to consider the average
case performance of a deviator rule over initial strategy profiles. In addition to having better
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results, it may distinguish better between different deviator rules.
Second, we examined only deterministic deviator rules. A mixed deviator rule returns a
distribution over the players rather than choosing one deterministically. The definition of the
inefficiency can be naturally extended to inefficiency of a mixed deviator rule using the expected
value of the social cost. A mixed local deviator rule computes that distribution as a function of
local information and satisfies an adjusted IIP condition. One possible definition is the following:
• Players with the same state vectors must have the same probability to be chosen.
• Let p(v) denote the accumulated probability of a state vector v, i.e., let I be the set of
players having state vector v, then p(v) ≡ ∑j∈I pj . A mixed local rule satisfies IIP if
in all profile vectors containing state vectors v1, v2 it holds that either p(v1) > p(v2) or
p(v1) ≤ p(v2). The idea is that a mixed local deviator rule consistently sets a distribution
over state vectors rather than players.
Third, while we studied only best response dynamics, better response dynamics can lead to
a wider outcome space. In better response dynamics the central authority has to choose the
deviating player along with a new strategy, making sure that the new strategy strictly improves
the deviating player’s cost. Best response sequence is a special case of better response sequence
with possibly a much limited search space. For example, in SPP network formation games
presented in subsection 2.3, better response dynamics give the deviator rule the power to solve
every segment separately as a pure symmetric game because a deviation of a player in one
segment can be done independently and without changing her strategy in all other segments.
In potential games, better response dynamics always converges to a Nash equilibrium, but the
convergence rate can be worse than in best response dynamics. Consider a symmetric network
formation game on a single segment. The Min-Path deviator rule is an optimal local deviator
rule for best response dynamics and it must converge within at most n deviations. However,
the analysis of better response dynamics is more challenging. Let us demonstrate this with
the following simple example. Consider single segment SPP network with three parallel edges
having costs 1, 2 and 3. In the initial profile, these links are used respectively by 0, 2 and 3
players. One can verify that BRD will converge to the middle edge whose cost is 2 - by deviation
of the three players on the expensive edge. On the other hand, a better response dynamics may
lead to convergence to the cheapest path by first migrating one player from the middle to the
expensive edge, and then moving all players (starting from the one on the middle edge) to the
cheapest edge. The social cost is lower but the number of deviations exceeds n. Studying the
power of better response dynamics as well as the tradeoff between the number of deviations and
the quality of the solution is an interesting direction for future work.
Fourth, we presented best response dynamics in which a single player deviates in every itera-
tion. Coordinated deviator rules enable a set of players (coalition) to deviate simultaneously with
the restriction that each of the coalition members strictly improves her cost. A Nash equilibrium
reached with no beneficial coordinated deviation is denoted a strong Nash equilibrium. It is well
known that not every potential game admits a strong PNE. For example, [27] showed that in a
network formation game with single-source and multiple-targets played on a network that is not
an SPP network, there is no strong PNE. [15] showed that in a game on an SPP network there
always exist a strong PNE. Moreover, [20] showed that in network formation games, even if a
strong PNE exists, not every beneficial coordinated deviations sequence converges to one. They
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introduced a restricted class of deviations, denoted dominance based beneficial coalition devia-
tion , which ensures convergence. There are many open directions in the study of coordinated
deviator rules, referring to their inefficiency, as well as to the wide range of possible deviations
of the chosen coalition.
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A Network Topologies
Consider a directed graph G = (V,E) with two designated nodes, a source s ∈ V and a target
t ∈ V . Assume that every edge is on some s − t path in G. The following operations may be
applied on G:
• Identification: the identification of two nodes v1, v2 ∈ V yields a new graph G′ = (V ′, E′),
where V ′ = (V ∪ {v})\{v1, v2} and E′ includes all the edges of E, where each edge that
was connected to v1 or v2 is now connected to v instead. Figuratively, the identification
operation is the collapse of two nodes into one.
• Series composition: Given two networks, G1 = (V1, E1) with s1, t1 ∈ V1 and G2 = (V2, E2)
with s2, t2 ∈ V2, the series composition G = G1 → G2 is the network formed by identifying
t1 and s2 in the union network G
′ = (V1 ∪ V2, E1 ∪ E2). In the composed network G, the
new source is s1 and the new sink is t2.
• Parallel composition: Given two symmetric networks, G1 = (V1, E1) with s1, t1 ∈ V1 and
G2 = (V2, E2) with s2, t2 ∈ V2, the parallel composition G = G1 ‖ G2 is the network
formed by identifying the nodes s1 and s2 (forming a new source s) and the nodes t1 and
t2 (forming a new sink t) in the union network G
′ = (V1 ∪ V2, E1 ∪ E2).
The following classes of network topologies are of special interest:
• A network G = (V,E) is an extension-parallel (EP) network if one of the following applies:
– G consists of a single edge.
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– There are two EP networks G1, G2 such that G = G1 ‖ G2.
– There is an EP network G1 and an edge e such that G = G1 → e or G = e→ G1.
• A network G = (V,E) is a series of parallel-paths (SPP) network if it consists of some
edges in parallel composition G = e1 ‖ e2 ‖ ... ‖ ek, or if there are two SPP networks
G1, G2 such that G = G1 → G2.
We note that the classes of EP and SPP networks are not comparable, that is, an SPP
network is not necessarily an EP one, and vise versa.
B Inefficient deviator rule in a job scheduling game with con-
flicting congestion effects
Theorem B.1 The inefficiency of a deviator rule in a job scheduling game with conflicting
congestions effects can be Ω(B
1
3 ).
Proof: Let B be an activation cost such that B
1
3 is an integer. The initial profile consists of
B
1
3 + 1 machines, having initial loads l1 = l2 = ... = l
B
1
3
= B
1
3 , and l
B
1
3+1
= B. Notice that
the condition specified in Lemma 3.6 holds for every Mj , 1 ≤ j ≤ B 13 . Specifically,
n− lj
m− j =
B +B
1
3 (B
1
3 − 1)
B
1
3 − j + 1
>
B
B
1
3 + 1
=
B
lj + 1
.
In addition, by Observation 3.5, the loaded machine will clearly remain active in any NE, since it
is high in p0. We conclude that there exists a BR-sequence in which all B
1
3 + 1 machines remain
active. In particular, a deviator rule that always selects a high machine will lead to a NE in
which the jobs are balanced among all m machines. Another possible BR-sequence lets the jobs
migrate from M1 to M
B
1
3
, then from M2, etc. Note that after the first migration M
B
1
3
is the only
best response for all of the jobs. One can verify that when M
B
1
3−2 is emptied the jobs on MB 13−1
can still benefit from migration to M
B
1
3
since c(B
1
3 ) = c( B
B
1
3
) = c(B
2
3 ) > c(B
1
3 (B
1
3 − 1) + 1).
Therefore, the only active machines in the NE reached are M
B
1
3
,M
B
1
3+1
, i.e., only two active
machines. The inefficiency of this sequence is:
c(n2 )
c( n
B
1
3+1
)
=
c(B+B
1
3 ·B 13
2 )
c(B+B
1
3 ·B 13
B
1
3+1
)
=
c(B
2
3
B
1
3+1
2 )
c(B
2
3 )
=
B
2
3
B
1
3+1
2 +
2B
1
3
B
1
3+1
B
2
3 +B
1
3
≥ B
2
3
B
1
3+1
2
B
1
3 (B
1
3 + 1)
=
B
1
3
2
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